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Abstract
Detecting manipulated facial images and videos is an in-
creasingly important topic in digital media forensics. As
advanced synthetic face generation and manipulation meth-
ods become available, new types of fake face representa-
tions are being created and raise significant concerns for
their implications in social media. Hence, it is crucial to
detect the manipulated face image and locate manipulated
facial regions. Instead of simply using a multi-task learn-
ing approach to simultaneously detect manipulated images
and predict the manipulated mask (regions), we propose to
utilize the attention mechanism to process and improve the
feature maps of the classifier model. The learned attention
maps highlight the informative regions to further improve
the binary classification power, and also visualize the ma-
nipulated regions. In addition, to enable our study of ma-
nipulated facial images detection and localization, we have
collected the first database which contains numerous types
of facial forgeries. With this dataset, we perform a thorough
analysis of data-driven fake face detection. We demonstrate
that the use of an attention mechanism improves manipu-
lated facial region localization and fake detection.
1. Introduction
Human faces play an important role in human-human
communication and association of side information, e.g.,
gender, age, with identity. For instance, face recognition
systems are increasingly utilized in our daily life for a mul-
titude of applications such as phone unlocking, access con-
trol, and payment [42]. However, these advances also en-
tice malicious actors to manipulate face images to launch
attacks, aiming to be successfully authenticated as the gen-
uine user. Moreover, manipulation of facial content has be-
come ubiquitous, and raises new concerns especially in so-
cial media around the world [36, 34, 35]. Recent advances
in deep learning have led to a dramatic increase in the real-
ism of face synthesis and enabled a rapid and far-reaching
∗denotes equal contribution by the authors.
Figure 1. Three types of fake face attacks: (a) physical spoofing
attack, (b) adversarial face attack, c) digital manipulation attack.
dissemination of “fake news” [4]. Therefore, to mitigate the
adverse impact caused by fake face attacks, and benefit both
public security and privacy, it is crucial to develop effective
visual forensics solutions against these threats.
As in Fig. 1, there are three main types of fake face
attacks. i) Physical spoofing attacks can be as simple as
printed paper, replaying image/video on a smartphone, or
as complicated as a 3D mask [28, 21, 29]. ii) Adversarial
face attacks generate high-quality and perceptually imper-
ceptible adversarial examples that can evade automated face
matchers [17, 31, 15, 48]. iii) Digital manipulation attacks,
made feasible by Variational AutoEncoders (VAEs) [25, 33]
and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [16], can
generate whole or partially modified photorealistic face im-
ages, which are indistinguishable by humans. Among these
three types, our research addresses only digital manipula-
tion attacks, with the objective of automatically detecting
manipulated faces, as well as localizing modified facial re-
gions. We interchangably use the team “face manipulation
detection”, or “face forgery detection” to describe our ob-
jective.
Digital facial manipulation methods fall into one of four
categories: face expression swap, face identity swap, facial
attributes manipulation and entire face synthesis. 3D face
reconstruction and animation methods [14, 55] are widely
used for facial expression swap, such as Face2Face [40].
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Figure 2. Our face forgery detection aims to tackle faces generated
by four types of face manipulation methods. Given a face image,
our proposed approach outputs the binary classification result and
localizes the manipulated regions via estimated attention map. For
real or entirely synthetic face images, our estimated attention maps
are all zeros or ones.
These methods enable the transfer of facial expressions
from one person to another person in real time with only
RGB cameras. Identity swap methods replace the face
of a person with the face of another. Examples include
FaceSwap, which inserts famous actors into movie clips
where they never appeared [7] and DeepFakes, which per-
forms face swapping using deep learning algorithms. At-
tributes manipulation edits single or multiple attributes in
a face, e.g., gender, age, skin color, hair, and glasses.
The adversarial framework of GANs is used for image
translation [20, 53, 54] or manipulation in a given con-
text [6, 38], which diversifies facial images synthesis.
FaceApp [2] has popularized facial attribute manipulation
as a consumer-level application, which provides 28 fil-
ters to modify specific attributes [2]. The fourth cate-
gory is entire face synthesis. Fueled by the large amounts
of face data, along with the success of GANs, any ama-
teur user is capable of producing a complete synthetic fa-
cial image. The realism achieved by the deep learning
methods is such that even humans have difficulty assess-
ing if a face image is genuine or manipulated. For in-
stance, websites such as thispersondoesnotexist.
com and thecleverest.com/judgefakepeople
offer evidence of the level of realism achieved by GAN-
based methods [22, 12, 23].
Research on the face manipulation detection has been se-
riously hampered by the lack of adequate datasets. Existing
approaches are often evaluated on small datasets with lim-
ited manipulation types, including Zhou et al. [52], Deep-
fake [26], and FaceForensics/FaceForensics++ [34, 35].
To remedy this issue, we collect a diverse fake face dataset
(DFFD) of 2.6 million images from all four categories of
digital face manipulations defined above.
Due to the fact that the modification of a face image
can be in whole or in part, we assume that a well-learned
network would gather different amount of information spa-
tially, in order to detect manipulated faces. We hypothesize
that correctly estimating this spatial information can enable
the network to focus on these important spatial regions to
make its decision. Hence, here we aim to not only detect
manipulated faces, but also automatically locate the ma-
nipulated regions, by estimating an image-specific attention
map, as in Fig. 2. We also demonstrate that this attention
map is beneficial to the final task of face forgery detection.
In the future, we hope the predicted attention maps for ma-
nipulated face images and videos could reveal hints about
the type, magnitude, and intention of the manipulation.
In summary, the contributions of this work include:
 A comprehensive fake face dataset include 0.8M real
faces and 1.8M fake faces generated by diverse face modifi-
cation methods, and an accompanying evaluation protocol.
 A novel attention-based layer to improve classification
performance and produce an attention map indicating the
manipulated facial regions.
 A novel metric, termed Inverse Intersection Non-
Containment (IINC), for evaluating attention maps that pro-
duces a more coherent evaluation than existing metrics.
 The state-of-the-art performance of face manipulation
detection in comparison to the strong baseline network.
2. Related Work
Digital Face Manipulation Methods. With the rapid
progress in computer graphics and computer vision, the
quality of digital face manipulation has reached to a level
where it is difficult for humans to tell the difference be-
tween genuine and manipulated faces [35]. Graphics-based
approaches are widely used for identity or expression trans-
fer by first reconstructing 3D models for both source and
target faces, and then exploiting the corresponding 3D ge-
ometry (identity or expression) to warp between them. In
particular, Thies et al. [39] present expression swap for fa-
cial reenactment using a consumer-level RGB-D camera.
Face2Face [40] is an advanced real-time face reenactment
system using only an RGB camera. Instead of manipulat-
ing expression only, the extended work “Deep Video Por-
traits” [24] can transfer the full 3D head position, head ro-
tation, expression, and eye blinking from a source actor to a
portrait video of a target actor. “Synthesizing Obama” [38]
animates the face of a person based on an input audio sig-
nal. FaceSwap can replace the identity of 3D models while
preserving the original expressions.
Deep learning techniques, not surprisingly, are now pop-
ular to synthesize or manipulate faces [41]. The term Deep-
fakes has widely become a synonym for face identity re-
placement based on deep learning [35]. There are vari-
ous public implementations of Deepfakes, most recently by
ZAO [3] and FaceAPP [2]. FaceAPP can selectively modify
parts of a face [2]. GAN-based methods can produce entire
synthetic face images, including non-face background. PG-
GAN [22] and StyleGAN [23] improve the image quality
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with a progressive growing strategy or a novel generator.
Fake Face Benchmarks. Unfortunately, large and diverse
datasets for face manipulation detection and evaluation are
limited in the community. Zhou et al. [52] collected a
dataset with face-swapped images generated by an iOS app
and an open-source face swap software. Video-based face
manipulation became available with the release of Face-
Forensics [34], which contains 0.5M Face2Face manipu-
lated frames from over 1,000 videos. An extended version,
FaceForensics++ [35], further augments the collection with
Deepfake [1] and FaceSwap manipulations. However, these
datasets are still limited to two fake types (identity and ex-
pression swap). To overcome this limitation, we collect the
first fake face dataset that includes diverse fake types, i.e.,
identity and expression swapped images from FaceForen-
sics++, face attribute manipulated images using FaceAPP,
and complete fake face images using StyleGAN [23] and
PGGAN [22]. Our dataset is described in detail in Sec. 4.
Attention Mechanism Localization. There are two
common approaches to localize manipulated image re-
gions: segmenting the entire image [5, 32], and repeat-
edly performing binary classification using a sliding win-
dow [35]. These localization methods are often imple-
mented via multi-task learning with additional supervision,
and they do not directly improve the final image classi-
fication performance. In contrast, we propose an atten-
tion mechanism to automatically detect the manipulated re-
gion for face images, which requires very few trainable pa-
rameters (either zero or one conv filter in our implemen-
tations). In computer vision, attention models have been
widely used for image classification [9, 47, 43], image in-
painting [27, 51] and object detection [50, 8]. Attention not
only serves to select a focused location but also enhances
object representations at that location, which is effective for
learning generalizable features for the given task. A number
of methods [45, 46, 19] utilize the attention mechanism to
enhance the accuracy of CNN classification models. Resid-
ual Attention Network [43] improves the accuracy of the
classification model using 3D self-attention maps. Choe et
al. [11] propose an attention-based dropout layer to pro-
cess the feature maps of the model, which can be applied
to CNN classifiers to improve the localization accuracy. To
our knowledge, this is the first paper to apply the attention
mechanism to face manipulation detection and localization.
3. Proposed Method
We cast the manipulated face detection as a binary clas-
sification problem by a CNN-based network. We further
propose to utilize the attention mechanism to process the
feature maps of the classifier model. The learned attention
maps can highlight the regions in an image which influence
the CNN’s decision, and further be used to guide the CNN
to discover more discriminative features.
3.1. Motivation for the Attention Map
Assuming the attention map can highlight the regions of
the image that are manipulated, and thereby guide the net-
work to detect these regions. This alone should be useful
for the face forgery detection. In fact, each pixel in the at-
tention map would compute a probability that its receptive
field corresponds to a manipulated region in the input im-
age. For example, in the Xception network, the input image
size is 299 × 299 and the attention map is at a lower reso-
lution, e.g., 19× 19. Each pixel in the attention map would
describe the probability of manipulation for a local patch of
size 16× 16 in the input image.
The attention map is effective at determining the manipu-
lated regions because of the modification of high frequency
noise in local patches of an image. Digital forensics has
shown that camera model identification is possible due to
“fingerprints” in the high-frequency information of a real
image. Because of this, it is feasible to detect abnormalities
in this high-frequency information due to algorithmic pro-
cessing. Hence we insert the attention map into the back-
bone networks where the receptive field corresponds to ap-
propriately sized local patches. Then, the features before
the attention map encode the high-frequency fingerprint for
the corresponding patch, which can be used to discriminate
between real and manipulated regions at the local level.
Three major factors were considered during the con-
struction and development of our attention map; i) explain-
ability, ii) usefulness, and iii) modularity.
Explainability: Due to the fact that a face image can be
modified entirely or in part, we produce an attention map
that predicts where the modified pixels are. In this way,
an auxiliary output is produced to explain which spatial re-
gions the network based its decision on. This differs from
prior works in that we use the attention map as a mask to re-
move any irrelevant information from the high-dimensional
features within the network. During training, for a face im-
age where the entire image is real, the attention map should
ignore the entire image. For a modified or generated face, at
least some parts of the image are manipulated, and therefore
the attention map should focus only on these parts.
Usefulness: One requirement of our proposed attention
map is that it enhances the final classification performance
of the network. This is accomplished by feeding the at-
tention map back into the network to ignore non-activated
regions. This follows naturally from the fact that modified
images may only be partially modified. Through the atten-
tion map, we can remove the real regions of a partial fake
image so that the features used for final anti-fake classifica-
tion are purely from modified regions.
Modularity: To create a truly utilitarian solution, we
take great care to maintain the modularity of the solution.
Our proposed attention map can be implemented easily and
inserted into existing backbone networks, through the inclu-
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Figure 3. The architecture of our face manipulation detection. Given any backbone network, our proposed attention-based layer can be
inserted into the network, where one specific example of this insertion is in Fig. 6. It takes the high-dimensional feature F as input,
estimates an attention map Matt using either PCA or regression-based methods, and channel-wise multiplies with the high-dimensional
feature, which is fed back into the backbone. In addition to the binary classification supervision Lclassifier, either supervised or weakly
supervised loss, Lmap, can be applied to estimate the attention map, depending on whether ground truth manipulation mapMgt is available.
sion of a single convolution layer, its associated loss func-
tions, and masking the subsequent high-dimensional fea-
tures. This can even be done while leveraging pre-trained
networks by initializing only the weights that are used to
produce the attention map.
3.2. Attention-based Layer
As shown in Fig. 3, the attention-based layer can be ap-
plied to any feature map of a classification model, and in-
duce the model to learn the manipulated regions of the fake
image. Specifically, the input of the attention-based layer is
a convolutional feature map F ∈ RB×H×W×C , where B is
the batch size, andH ,W , C are height, width, and the num-
ber of channels, respectively. Then we can generate an at-
tention map Matt ∈ RB×H×W by processing F. Here, we
propose two approaches to implement the attention-based
layer: self-attention PCA projection and direct regression.
Self-attention PCA Projection. Instead of simply com-
pressingF via channel-wise average pooling to generate the
attention map [11], we adopt Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA) to summarize features over channel so that we
can observe the largest variation in the high-dimensional
space [10, 29]. Firstly, F is reshaped into a matrix X ∈
R(B·H·W )×C . We utilize Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) to find the largest eigenvector v ∈ RC×1 of the co-
variance matrix (X−µ)T (X−µ), where µ is the row-wise
mean of X. By projecting mean-removed X onto v and
applying a Sigmoid activation, we obtain the attention map:
Matt = Sigmoid((X− µ)Tv). (1)
Since the entire network is trained to perform binary
classification, the feature map X includes information dis-
criminative between real and fake facial parts. Performing
PCA will discover the feature dimension v that is the most
discriminative between real and fake, and project mean-
removed samples of a mini-batch to this dimension. As-
suming the real samples are on the negative side of this di-
mension and fake samples on the positive side, the Sigmoid
function turns former to be near 0 and the latter to be
bounded at 1. As a result, the intensity of each pixel in
the attention map is close to 0 for the real regions, and close
to 1 for the fake regions. In other words, the pixel of the
attention map indicates the probability of the original im-
age patch being a fake region. Note that within a B-sample
mini-batch, 60% of the samples are fake images and 40%
are real ones, in order to balance the numbers of real and
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Table 1. Comparison of fake face datasets along different aspects: number of still images, number of videos, number of fake types (identity
swap (Id. swap), expression swap (Exp. swap), attributes manipulation, and entire image synthesis (Entire syn.)) and pose variation.
Dataset Year
# Still images # Video clips # Fake types Pose
Real Fake Real Fake Id. swap Exp. swap Attr. mani. Entire syn. variation
Zhou et al. [52] 2018 2, 010 2, 010 - - 2 - - - Unknown
Yang et al. [49] 2018 241 252 49 49 1 - - - Unknown
Deepfake [26] 2018 - - - 620 1 - - - Unknown
FaceForensics++ [35] 2019 - - 1, 000 3, 000 2 1 - - [−30◦, 30◦]
FakeSpotter [44] 2019 6, 000 5, 000 - - - - - 2 Unknown
DFFD (proposed) 2019 58, 703 240, 527 1, 000 3, 000 2 1 28 + 40 2 [−90◦, 90◦]
fake at the level of image patches, as many fake images are
only partially manipulated.
The PCA projection layer uses self-attention which does
not require additional trainable parameters. Finally, the at-
tention map is channel-wise multiplied with the feature map
F. This helps the subsequent backbone network to focus its
processing to the non-zeros areas of the attention map, i.e.,
the fake regions.
Direct Regression. Another option to implement the
attention-based layer is to compute the spatial attention map
using auxiliary convolutional layer(s). Simply, we add one
more channel in the previous convolutional layer to gener-
ate the feature map of size F ∈ RB×H×W×(C+1). F can be
split into F1 ∈ RB×H×W×C and Matt ∈ RB×H×W×1.
The last channel with sigmoid function serves as the at-
tention map. The attention map is applied to the feature
map F1 by channel-wise multiplication and fed to the sub-
sequent convolutional layers.
This direct regression method is simple, yet effective, for
adaptive feature refinement. Later we show that the benefits
of our proposed attention layer are realized regardless of
the choice of backbone networks. This further validates our
claim that the proposed solution is modular and improves
the usefulness and flexibility of the attention map.
3.3. Loss Functions
To train the binary classification network, it is possible
to begin with a pre-trained backbone network or to learn
the backbone network from scratch. Either way, the overall
loss for the training is as follows:
L = λc ∗ Lclassifier + λm ∗ Lmap, (2)
where Lclassifier is the binary classification loss of Softmax
and Lmap is the attention map loss. λc and λm are the re-
spective loss weights.
For attention map learning, we consider three different
cases: supervised, weakly supervised, and unsupervised.
Supervised learning. If the training samples are paired
with ground truth attention masks, we can train the network
in a supervised fashion, shown in Eqn. 3.
Lmap = |Matt −Mgt|, (3)
where Mgt is the ground truth manipulation mask. We use
zero-maps as the Mgt for real faces, and one-maps as the
Mgt for entire synthesized fake faces. For partially manip-
ulated faces, we pair fake images with their corresponding
source images, compute the absolute pixel-wise difference
in the RGB channels, convert into grayscale, and divide by
255 to produce a map in the range of [0, 1]. We finally set a
threshold of 0.1, which is empirically determined and val-
idated in later experiments, to obtain the binarized modifi-
cation map as Mgt. We posit this strong supervision can
help attention-based layer to learn the most discriminative
regions and features for fake face detection.
Weakly supervised learning. For partially manipu-
lated faces, sometimes the source images are not available.
Hence, we can not obtain the ground truth manipulation
mask as described above. However, we would still like to
include these faces in learning the attention maps. To this
end, we propose a weak supervision map loss as in Eqn. 4:
Lmap =
{
|Miatt − 0|, if real
|max(Miatt)− 0.75|, if fake
(4)
where Miatt is the attention map of the i-th sample in a
mini-batch. This loss drives the attention map to remain
un-activated for real images, i.e., zeros. For fake images,
regardless of entire or partial manipulation, the maximum
map value should be a sufficiently large value, 0.75 in our
experiments. The implies that, for partial manipulation, it is
acceptable that most of the map values are zeros, as long as
at least one modified local region has a large map value.
Unsupervised learning. We can train the network with-
out any map supervision when λm is set to 0. With only
image-level classification supervision, the attention maps
learn informative region automatically. More analysis of
these three losses is available in the experiments section.
4. Diverse Fake Face Dataset
One of our contributions is the construction of a dataset
with diverse types of fake faces, termed Diverse Fake Face
Dataset (DFFD). Compared with the previous fake face
datasets in Tab. 1, DFFD contains greater diversity in fake
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(a) (b)
Figure 4. (a) Distribution of the face bounding box sizes (pixel)
and (b) Age distribution of our DFFD.
types, which is crucial for research on the detection and lo-
calization of face manipulations.
Data Collection. In Sec. 1, we introduced four types
of digital manipulation methods: identity swap, expression
swap, attribute manipulation, and entire synthesized faces.
We collect data from all these four categories by adopting
respective state-of-the-art methods to generate fake images,
described below. For DFFD, we analyze the gender and age
distribution, and the face size of all samples, as in Fig. 4.
Among all images and video frames, 47.7% are from male
subjects, 52.3% are from female, and the majority of sam-
ples are from subjects in the range 21 − 50 years of age.
For the face size, both real and fake samples have low qual-
ity, as well as high quality images. This ensures that the
distributions of gender, age, and face size are less biased.
Real face images. We utilize FFHQ [23] and
CelebA [30] datasets as our real face samples since the faces
contained here cover comprehensive variations in race, age,
gender, pose, illumination, expression, resolution, and cam-
era capture quality. They have been used in digital fake
face detection as real samples. We further utilize the source
frames from FaceForensics++ [35] as additional real faces.
Identity and expression swap. For facial identity and
expression swap, we use all the video clips from Face-
Forensics++ [35]. The FaceForensics++ contains 1,000
real videos collected from YouTube and their correspond-
ing 3,000 manipulated versions which are divided into two
groups: identity swap using FaceSwap and Deepfake [1],
and expression swap using Face2Face [40]. From the web-
site 1, we also collected identity swap data, which are enter-
tainment videos generated by Deep Face Lab (DFL) 2.
Attributes manipulation. We adopt two meth-
ods FaceAPP [2] and StarGAN [12] to generate attribute
manipulated images, where 4,000 faces of FFHQ and 2,000
faces of CelebA are the input source real images, respec-
tively. FaceAPP, as a consumer-level smart phone applica-
tion, provides 28 filters to modify specified facial attributes,
e.g., gender, age, hair, skin color, beard, and glasses. The
manipulated images are generated with an automated script
1https://www.patreon.com/ctrl_shift_face
2https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLab
Figure 5. Example faces in our DFFD. (a) Real images/frames
from FFHQ, CelebA and FaceForensics++ datasets; (b) Paired
face identity swap images from FaceForensics++ dataset; (c)
Paired face expression swap images from FaceForensics++
dataset; (d) Attributes manipulated examples by FaceAPP and
StarGAN; (e) Entire synthesized faces by PGGAN and StyleGAN.
working on Android devices. For each face in FFHQ, we
generate three corresponding fake images. Two of them are
generated using a single random manipulation filter, and the
last one uses multiple random manipulation filters. Star-
GAN, a GAN-based image-to-image translation method,
can generate 40 types of facial attribute manipulations. For
each face in CelebA, we generate 40 fake images. In total,
we collect 92K attribute manipulated images.
Entire face synthesis. Recent works in image synthe-
sis, PGGAN [22] and StyleGAN [23], achieve remark-
able results in realistic face image synthesis. PGGAN pro-
poses a progressive training methodology both for genera-
tor and discriminator, which can produce high-quality im-
ages. StyleGAN redesigns the generator by borrowing from
style transfer literature. Consequently, we use the pre-
trained model of PGGAN and StyleGAN to create 200k and
100k high-quality entire fake images, respectively. Figure 5
shows some examples of DFFD.
Pre-processing. We use insightFace [18] to estimate the
bounding box and 5 landmarks for each image. We discard
images whose detection or alignment fails. We further gen-
erate ground truth manipulation masks for fake images as
described in Sec. 3.3. To enforce consistency, if a fake face
image is derived from a source real face image, we use the
same landmarks of the real face image for face cropping.
Protocols. As shown in Tab. 2, we collect 781,727 sam-
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Table 2. Statistics of our DFFD composition and protocol. The total number of available samples, training samples, validation samples,
and testing samples are 2,653,734, 124,731, 12,738 and 161,761, respectively.
Dataset # Total Samples # Training # Validation # Testing Average face width (pixel)
Real
FFHQ [23] 70, 000 10, 000 999 9, 000 750
CelebA [30] 202, 599 9, 974 997 8, 979 200
Original @ FaceForensics++ [35] 509, 128 10, 230 998 7, 526 200
Fake
Id. Swap
DFL 49, 235 10, 006 1, 007 38, 222 200
Deepfakes @ FaceForensics++ [35] 509, 128 10, 230 999 7, 517 200
FaceSwap @ FaceForensics++ [35] 406, 140 8, 123 770 6, 056 200
Exp. Swap Face2Face @ FaceForensics++ [35] 509, 128 10, 212 970 7, 554 200
Attr. Manip. FaceAPP [2] 18, 416 6, 000 1, 000 5, 000 700StarGAN [12] 79, 960 10, 000 1, 000 35, 960 150
Entire Syn. PGGAN [22] 200, 000 19, 957 1, 998 17, 950 750StyleGAN [23] 100, 000 19, 999 2, 000 17, 997 750
Figure 6. The overall architecture of XceptionNet and its enhance-
ment with our proposed attention later. The original XceptionNet
has entry flow, middle flow, and exit flow, where the middle flow
is composed of 8 blocks and our attention layer (with detailed in
Fig. 3) could be added after one of the blocks.
ples for real image/frames, and 1,872,007 samples for fake
ones. Within these samples, we randomly select a subset of
58,703 real images/frames and 240,527 fake ones to make
the size of our dataset manageable and to ensure the sizes of
each sub-category is balanced. For video samples, we ex-
tract one frame per second in order to reduce the size with-
out decreasing the diversity of DFFD. We randomly split
the data into 50% for training, 5% for validation and 45%
for testing. All fake images manipulated from the same real
image are in the same set as the source image.
5. Experimental Result
We formulate the face manipulation detection as a binary
classification problem. Here, we present the performance of
the backbone networks with and without the proposed at-
tention map for both binary classification and manipulated
region localization. For all experiments, we utilize the pro-
tocols defined in Sec. 4. Unless otherwise stated, all results
are computed using the entirety of the test set.
5.1. Experimental Setup
Implementation Details: In our experiments, we add
the attention map and its associated loss functions to the
XceptionNet [13], VGG Net [37], and a custom network.
The overall architecture of XceptionNet and how it is en-
hanced by our attention layer are shown in Fig. 6. Values
of the loss weighting λ are set equal to each other and the
batch size is 16, where each mini-batch consists of 6 real
and 10 fake images. Depending on the backbone architec-
ture, we train for 75k-150k iterations, which requires less
than 8 hours on an NVidia GTX 1080Ti. We choose the
best model based on the validation set.
Metrics. For classification, we report EER (Equal Error
Rate), AUC (Area Under Curve) of ROC (Receiver Op-
erating Characteristic) curves, TDR (True Detect Rate) at
FDR (False Detect Rate) of 0.01% (denoted as TDR0.01%),
and TDR at FDR of 0.1% (denoted as TDR0.1%), respec-
tively. For localization, with known ground-truth masks, we
report Pixel-wise Binary Classification Accuracy (PBCA),
which treats each pixel as an independent sample to mea-
sure classification accuracy, Intersection over Union (IoU),
and Cosine similarity, which is the Cosine between two.
We also propose a novel metric, Inverse Intersection Non-
Containment (IINC) for evaluating manipulated face region
prediction, as described in Sec. 5.4.
5.2. Ablation Study
Here, we study three aspects of experiments, namely: i)
benefit of attention map, ii) attention map placement, and
iii) effect of backbone network architectures.
Benefit of Attention map. In this experiment, we uti-
lize the state-of-the-art XceptionNet [13] architecture as
our backbone network. It is based on depth-wise separable
convolution layers with residual connections. Here, Xcep-
tionNet is pre-trained on ImageNet and fine-tuned on our
dataset. During fine-tuning, the attention layer is inserted
between Block 4 and Block 5 in the middle flow, as in Fig. 6.
The last layer is modified into a fully connected layer with
two outputs.
In Tab. 3, we show a comparison of the PCA projection
and direct regression attention with different loss function
strategies, including without supervision (w/o sup.), weakly
supervised loss (weak sup.) and supervised loss (sup.).
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Table 3. Ablation for the benefit of the attention map, with various
combinations of map generation methods and supervisions. Bold-
face, blue and red indicates top three performance, respectively.
Map Supervision AUC EER TDR0.01% TDR0.1% PBCA
Xception 99.61 2.88 77.42 85.26 −
+ Reg. Map, w/o sup. 99.76 2.16 77.07 89.70 12.89
+ Reg. Map, weak sup. 99.66 2.57 46.57 75.20 30.99
+ Reg. Map, sup. 99.64 2.23 83.63 90.78 88.44
+ Reg. Map, sup. - map 99.69 2.73 48.54 72.94 88.44
+ PCA Map, w/o sup. 99.02 4.94 69.53 78.53 20.95
+ PCA Map, weak sup. 99.71 2.36 72.07 86.71 59.20
+ PCA Map, sup. 99.64 2.39 78.00 89.58 85.80
+ PCA Map, sup. - map 99.53 2.90 52.26 64.21 85.80
Table 4. The performance of the attention map at different place-
ments in the middle flow of the XceptionNet architecture.
Map position AUC EER TDR0.01% TDR0.1% PBCA
Block1 99.82 1.69 71.46 92.80 83.30
Block2 99.84 1.72 67.95 90.14 87.41
Block3 99.50 2.82 49.06 72.50 88.14
Block4 99.64 2.23 83.83 90.78 88.44
Block5 99.49 2.62 82.70 89.03 88.40
Block6 99.72 2.28 63.08 86.02 87.41
Block7 99.78 1.79 28.51 88.98 88.39
Block8 98.62 4.42 74.24 79.95 88.96
Given the overall strong performance for all entries and the
preferred operational point of low FDR in practices, we fo-
cus on the TDR metrics for comparing various methods.
First of all, the sup cases outperform the weak supervision
or without supervision, in both the binary classification and
the map classification accuracy. Second, when the ground
truth map supervision is not available, the proposed PCA-
projection is superior to the direct regression. We hypothe-
size part of the reason is that PCA-projection has no train-
able parameters in the attention-based layer. This shows the
strength of learning few parameters when there is a lack of
supervision. Due to the superior performance of the regres-
sion attention map with supervision, we use this method for
all other experiments.
Instead of using the softmax output, an alternative is to
use the average of the estimated attention map for binary
classification, since loss functions desire low attention val-
ues for real faces while higher values for fake faces. The
performance of this alternative is shown in the rows for ‘+
Reg. Map, sup. - map’ and ‘+ PCA Map, sup. - map’ in
Tab. 3. The substantial lower performance comparing to us-
ing softmax output shows that it is important to have the
feedback from the attention map to the subsequent network
through channel-wise multiplication.
Attention Layer Placement. In this experiment, we in-
vestigate the effects of the placement of the attention layer
within the XceptionNet middle flow. As shown in Fig. 6, the
attention layer can be placed after any of the eight blocks.
Tab. 4 shows that the attention layer placement can signif-
Table 5. The performance of three backbone architectures with and
without the attention maps.
Network AUC EER TDR0.01% TDR0.1%
Xception 99.61 2.88 77.42 85.26
Xception + Reg. Map 99.64 2.23 83.83 90.78
Xception + PCA Map 99.64 2.39 78.00 89.58
VGG 96.95 8.43 0.00 51.14
VGG + Reg. Map 99.46 3.40 44.16 61.97
VGG + PCA Map 98.81 5.20 0.00 75.39
Custom 98.08 6.54 29.91 52.92
Custom + Reg. Map 98.66 5.41 25.21 58.45
Custom + PCA Map 99.20 4.33 34.06 71.14
Figure 7. Fake face detection ROCs with various XceptionNet
models.
icantly influence the binary classification task. Two trends
are evident. Placement of the attention layer early in the
network improves the EER. Later placement improves the
map classification accuracy, since it increases the recep-
tive field of each pixel in the attention map, and hence can
rely on more information to make a decision locally. How-
ever, middle placement exhibits strong performance for all
metrics, without significant degradation. In the rest of our
experiments, results are reported based on ‘Block4’, i.e.,
placement after Block4.
Dependency on Backbone Networks. We use
VGG16 [37], XceptionNet [13], and our custom network
as backbone networks. For VGG16, the attention layer is
inserted after the third convolution block, which produces
a 28x28 feature map. The custom network is composed of
3 convolution blocks, each with 3 convolution layers fol-
lowed by max pooling. The outputs of each block are con-
catenated together and passed through 2 more convolution
layers. These features are used to produce the attention map
of size 16x16, and after channel-wise multiplication with
it, are further processed to produce the final binary clas-
sification. Tab. 5 results validate that using attention map
does improve the backbone network performance no mat-
ter which backbone network we use. In all three cases, the
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Figure 8. Failure examples of the Xception with Regression Map
under supervision. From left to right, the columns are top 3 worst
samples of real, identity manipulated, expression manipulated,
completely generated, and attribute modified, respectively.
Table 6. Fake face detection performance of the Xception Regres-
sion Map with supervision for each fake type.
Fake Type AUC EER TDR0.01% TDR0.1%
ID Manip. 99.43 3.11 65.16 77.76
EXP Manip. 99.40 3.40 71.23 80.87
Attr. Manip. 99.92 1.09 81.32 90.93
Entire Syn. 100.00 0.05 99.89 99.96
application of attention maps improved the performance of
backbone architectures. For the XceptionNet and VGG, the
regression map shows better performance, but for the cus-
tom network, the PCA map shows better performance. This
is due to the smaller size of the custom network and the fact
that it is trained from scratch, rather than fine-tuned, on our
dataset. Training from scratch allows the PCA map to guide
the feature learning from the early stage to maximize its im-
pact, whereas for fine-tuning, the PCA map must gradually
adapt to the pre-trained feature extraction.
5.3. Fake Face Detection
In Fig. 7, we show the ROCs of the XceptionNet with
and without the attention map. From this figure, it is clear
that the direct regression approach for the attention map
produces the best performing network at very low FDR,
which is not only the most challenging scenario, but also
the most relevant to the practical applications. This also
demonstrates that our proposed approach substantially out-
performs the conventional XceptionNet-based manipulation
detection, especially at lower FDR.
For our best performing model, Xception Regression
Map with supervision, we conduct failure analysis in two
aspects. (i) Fig. 8 shows the worst 3 test samples among
the real test faces and each fake types. For example, the
images in the first column have the lowest Softmax proba-
bility of being the real class. Among these samples, some
have heavy makeup, and others are of low image quality.
(ii) Tab. 6 shows the accuracy of testing samples in each
(a) (b)
Figure 9. The attention map estimation performance of the pro-
posed method when using different thresholds to binarize the pre-
dicted map (a) and the ground truth map (b). The threshold for the
other map in either case was 0.1.
Figure 10. A toy-example comparison of 4 metrics for evaluating
the attention map estimation. GT and Est. are the ground truth
and estimated binary map, respectively, where white is the ma-
nipulated pixel and black is the real pixel. The IOU and Cosine
metrics do not adequately reflect the differences in the first 3 ex-
amples. Similarly, the PBCA is not useful for the last 3 examples.
In contrast, the proposed IINC metric is discriminative in all cases.
fake type. The completely synthesized images appear to be
the easiest for detection. This is due to the artificial “finger-
print” these methods leave on the generated images, which
is easily distinguishable from real images. In contrast, iden-
tity and expression manipulated images are the most chal-
lenging to detect, where image quality could be one poten-
tial reason, as in the second and third columns of Fig. 8.
5.4. Attention Map Estimation
The accuracy of attention map estimation of course de-
pends on the threshold used to binarize the map. In Fig. 9,
we show the accuracy of the attention map estimation, as a
function of the threshold. This demonstrates that our choice
of 0.1 as a threshold for both maps is appropriate.
We utilize three popular metrics for evaluating the atten-
tion maps: Intersection Over Union (IOU), Cosine Similar-
ity, and Pixel-wise Binary Classification Accuracy (PBCA).
However, these three metrics are inadequate for robust eval-
uation of these diverse maps. Thus, we propose a novel
metric defined in Eqn. 5, termed Inverse Intersection Non-
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0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.34 0.25 0.36 0.61 0.40 0.44 0.37 0.40
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.66 0.73 0.86 0.66 0.47 0.84 0.68 0.22
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 11. Example source images, manipulated images, ground truth manipulation masks, and estimated attention maps of (a) real, (b)
entirely synthesized, (c) attribute manipulation, (d) expression manipulation, and (e) identity manipulation. Below the images are the IINC
and PBCA between the maps.
Containment (IINC), to evaluate the predicted maps:
IINC =
1
3− |U| ∗

0 ifMgt = 0 andMatt = 0
1 ifMgt = 0 xorMatt = 0
(2− |I||Matt| −
|I|
|Mgt| ) otherwise,
(5)
where I and U are the intersection and union between the
ground truth map, Mgt, and the predicted attention map,
Matt, respectively. M and |M| are the mean and L1 norm
of M, respectively. The two fractional terms measure the
ratio of the area of the intersection with respect to the area
of each map, respectively. This improves upon other met-
rics by measuring the non-overlap ratio of both maps, rather
than their combined overlap, as in the IOU.
The benefits of the IINC metric as compared with other
metrics are shown in Fig. 10. Note that the IOU and Co-
sine similarity metrics are not useful at all for the first 3
samples, where the scores are the same, but the maps have
vastly different properties. Similarly, the PBCA is not use-
ful for the last 3 cases, because the ratio of mis-classification
is not represented in the score. E.g., the last case over-
estimates by a factor of 100% and the third to last over-
estimates by 200%, while the second to last both over- and
under-estimates by 150%. The IINC provides the optimal
ordering by producing the same order as the IOU when it
is useful (last 4 cases) and similarly with the PBCA when
it is useful (first 3 cases). This shows that IINC is a more
useful and robust metric for comparing the attention maps
than any of the previous metrics.
The ability of our best performing model (Xception Re-
gression Map with supervision) to predict the attention
maps is shown in Tab. 7. In Fig. 11, we show the IINC
and PBCA for test images. The ordering of the IINC scores
lines up with a qualitative human analysis. The first cases in
(d) and (e) are examples where the PBCA is high simply be-
Table 7. Evaluating attention maps with 4 metrics. Note IOU and
Cosine similarity are not appropriate to evaluate real images.
Data IINC IOU Cosine Sim. PBCA
All Real 0.015 − − 0.998
All Fake 0.147 0.715 0.192 0.828
Partial 0.311 0.401 0.429 0.786
Complete 0.077 0.847 0.095 0.847
All 0.126 − − 0.855
cause the majority of each map is non-activated. The IINC
is more discriminative in these cases due to the non-overlap
between the maps. For the third cases in (d) and (e), the
IINC produces the same score because the maps display the
same behavior (a large amount of over-activation), whereas
the PBCA prefers the example in (d) because the maps have
fewer activated pixels.
6. Conclusion
This paper tackles the digitally manipulated face image
detection and localization problem. The proposed method
leverages attention mechanism to process the feature maps
of the binary classification model. The learned attention
maps can highlight the informative face regions for improv-
ing the classification ability, and can also highlight the ma-
nipulated regions. In addition, we collect the first forgery
face dataset that contains diverse types of fake faces. Fi-
nally, we empirically show that the use of attention mech-
anism improves fake detection, and manipulated facial re-
gion localization. This is the first unified approach that
tackles a diverse set of face manipulation methods, and also
achieves the state-of-the-art performance in comparison to
prior network architectures.
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